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NOTES
and "formalisms" of the primary purpose test it was designed to
replace, the subjective motives of the taxpayer are no longer control-
ling. Thus, the origin test should lead to more consistent results.
Bruce Achille Gaudin
FUTURE INFLATION AND DAMAGE AWARDS
Although money damages awarded in a tort action cannot make
the victim whole again, the award provides the only means available
to compensate the plaintiff for his injury and to place him in a posi-
tion roughly equivalent to that which he enjoyed before the accident.I
In arriving at a figure that will theoretically reimburse the victim for
his loss, various factors must be considered.' One important compo-
nent often ignored in calculating the amount of damages is the possi-
bility that inflation may occur in the future. At the outset it should
be noted, however, that the only portion of the plaintiffs award that
may be affected by inflation is the sum given for some future eco-
nomic deprivation, such as loss of future wages or future medical
expenses; future economic developments are irrelevant to items such
as pain and suffering or past medical expenses which represent losses
that have already accrued at the time of judgment.
The need to adjust damage amounts to allow for future inflation
is sharpened by the impact of the technique, termed reducing to
"present value," often used by the courts to calculate future dam-
ages. An award for loss of future wages should exactly compensate the
victim for what he would have received had he not been injured; it
should not place him in a better monetary position than he would
have enjoyed had he received his future salary in periodic payments.3
If the victim is presently given the total dollar amount of damages
that the fact-finder has determined he is entitled to, he has been over-
compensated to the extent of the "earning power" of the sum he
receives.' A sum of money available at present is worth more than an
1. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916).
2. United States v. Boykin, 49 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1931) (present value of lump sum
award); Gaspard v. Le Maire, 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963) (effects of past and
present inflation); Brown v. S.A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891 (1960)
(victim's life expectancy); Edwards v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974)
(probability of future job promotion).
3. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916).
4. "So far as a verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits, it will
afford more than compensation if it be made up by aggregating the benefits without
taking account of the earning power of the money that is presently to be awarded. It
is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth more than the like sum of
money payable in the future." Id.
19751
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
identical sum of money received at any time in the future because
the recipient may invest the entire amount and garner interest.
Therefore, since the plaintiff is awarded his damages in a lump sum
and not over a period of time, the aggregate of the periodic payments
must be reduced.
Early in this century, the United States Supreme Court in
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kelly5 explicated the proper mode
of reducing to "present value." The sum to be awarded for future
wages is the amount which, if received at the time of judgment and
invested, yields the total amount of the lost wages if both interest and
principal were paid periodically over the span of the loss at the times
and in the amounts plaintiff would have received his wages. The
Court in Kelly reasoned that at the end of the period for which the
loss is calculated, the fund would be completely depleted and the
plaintiff would be in no better position because he had received a
lump sum than if he had continued to work and receive his paycheck.'
The assumption underlying the "present value" method of calcu-
lation is that the economy will remain stable and that the purchasing
power of a certain sum of money does not vary appreciably from year
to year. While that assumption may have been valid at the turn of
the century, it is no longer so today because of the presence of infla-
tion.7 Inflation is a persistent upward movement in the general price
level which results in a decline in purchasing power for a given
amount of money.' The effects of inflation thus undercut the basis for
present value reduction and an award made without considering the
effects of future inflation often undercompensates the victim.9
Many courts have refused to consider inflation, reasoning that
calculating its continued probable future impact is too speculative
and that its effects may be offset by spiraling interest rates or by the
victim's investing in appreciating assets. 0 The Fifth Circuit Court of
5. 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
6. Id. at 492.
7. See generally Henderson, Some Recent Decisions on Damages; With Special
Reference to Questions of Inflation and Income Taxes, 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 423 (1973).
8. Hearings on Cost Escalation in Defense Procurement Contracts Before the
House Comm. on Armed Services, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1973). See also THE AMERI-
CAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 623 (1963).
9. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer
Price Index for June, 1974, at 24 (Sept. 1974), showing that the Consumer Price Index
has risen from a base of 100 in 1967 to 147 in June, 1974.
10. See Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Williams v. United States,
435 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1970); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii
1965), afl'd, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967).
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Appeals in the recent case of Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co.," a Jones
Act proceeding, used similar reasoning to reverse the lower court's
damage award that had been increased to account for future infla-
tion. Although the court took judicial notice of the worsening infla-
tionary conditions, it was influenced by the strong governmental
countermeasures against inflation and noted that "[tihe worsening
of inflation might as readily foretell a recession or a depression as its
continuity."' 2
It seems, however, that future inflation computations are no
more speculative than any other determinations that must be made
to calculate damages that are routinely submitted to the judge or
jury, such as the present value of a lump sum award," the probability
of future job promotion,' or the life expectancy of the victim. 5 The
proper inquiry is not whether a particular factor is speculative but,
rather, the degree of probability with which it can be predicted."
That the courts have long reduced awards to present value demon-
strates that it is proper in calculating damages to consider the proba-
bility that the nation's economy will act in a particular way in the
future.
The court in Johnson also stated that the higher interest rates
that have traditionally accompanied inflation would mitigate the
failure to allow for future inflation. 7 Other courts have made a simi-
lar argument, contending that the effect of inflation may be offset by
the victim's investing in appreciating assets. 8 However, the erosive
11. 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (rehearing en banc), aff'g 469 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1972).
12. Id. at 236.
13. See, e.g., Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 513 P.2d 1140 (Ore. 1973). In
allowing a 5% increase per year for future inflation when computing plaintiff's future
wage loss, the court stated that this calculation was no more speculative than to
assume that the 5% interest rate used to compute the present value of the award would
remain stationary during the plaintiff's lifetime. Id. at 1146.
14. See, e.g., Edwards v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611, 616 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
15. See, e.g., Brown v. S.A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891 (1960).
16. See Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 727 (Iowa 1974): "The principal
argument for allowing consideration of future inflation is that an upward price move-
ment is probable .... " See also Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 513 P.2d 1140,
1146 (Ore. 1973): "[W]e do not think that it is 'pure speculation,' as contended by
defendant, for a qualified expert witness to infer from such a past history of inflation
• . . that during the next 23 years wage rates will continue to increase at an average
of at least 5% per year."
17. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975).
18. Frankel v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972) (refusing to allow consideration
of inflation in personal injury action claiming that rising interest rates would offset
rising inflation). See also Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974); Raines v.
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effect of inflation is not offset by the possibility that the victim might
invest his award in appreciating assets, or that interest rates will rise,
especially since the victim's present need for money, coupled in many
cases with a lack of requisite investment skill, prevents successful
hedging against inflation." Moreover, it would seem that any risk
involved because of adverse economic contingencies should be borne
by the tortfeasor, not the victim.
Jurisdictions recognizing future inflationary erosion as a compo-
nent of damage awards have adopted one of three approaches to
assess the impact of decreased purchasing power. Some courts hold
that no definite percentage figure for future inflation need be estab-
lished to calculate the final award; future inflation is just another
factor for the judge or jury to consider in awarding damages."0 This
method, adopted by the only two Louisiana courts to consider the
question," allows the jury to consider future inflationary trends with-
out the presentation of any specific evidence. Since the finder of fact
at the trial level has great discretion in setting damages, unless an
award is manifestly erroneous, a reviewing court may not disturb it."
Other courts which allow a consideration of future inflation do
so by assigning a definite figure to both the present value reduction
and the future inflation factor." Expert testimony may be admitted
to aid the courts in setting figures" and often statistics from the
New York Cent. R.R., 129 Ill. App. 2d 294, 263 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. 1970) (rev'd on
other grounds).
19. See Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974) (rejecting argument that
victim might hedge against future inflation by investing in assets such as land). But
see Raines v. New York Cent. R.R., 129 Ill. App. 2d 294, 263 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App. 1970)
(rev'd on other grounds) (reversible error to allow testimony concerning the difficulty
of hedging against inflation).
20. See, e.g., Brown v. S.A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891 (1960);
Edwards v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Henwood v. Moore, 203
S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
21. Brown v. S.A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891 (1960); Edwards
v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
22. See, e.g., Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351 (La.
1974); May v. Finest Foods, Inc., 303 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
23. See Pierce v. New York Cent. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mich. 1969), which
used an arbitrary 5% inflation figure to offset an equally arbitrary 5% present value
decrease. The case was remanded for other reasons concerning the issue of damages.
409 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1969). "Arbitrary" as used in this note refers to a figure which
has at one time received the approval of an appellate court and has thereafter been
used by lower courts without resorting to evidence on the issue in each case.
24. Scruggs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Va. 1970) (ac-
cepting expert witness' computation of loss of future earnings in wrongful death action
including a 3% yearly increase in plaintiff's earnings to account for future inflation);
Plourd v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 513 P.2d 1140 (Ore. 1973) (accentingcn, Port
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Bureau of Labor Statistics are used as well.25 Once the value of the
future loss is determined, it becomes merely a matter of mathemati-
cal calculation to compute the lump sum award. One court has even
used the inflation factor without allowing any reduction for present
value."6
The preferable method of approaching the problem is taken by
those courts which presume conclusively that the effects of future
inflation will offset any present value reduction; therefore, no adjust-
ment whatever is made in the gross amount awarded for future dam-
ages." This method has the advantage of simplicity, and, by consid-
ering both present value and future inflation, avoids subjecting either
party to the full brunt of the vagaries of economic fluctuations. How-
ever, whichever method is used, it seems that a consideration of the
inflation factor is preferable to no consideration at all.
William J. Knight
THE PARTNER'S RIGHT OF DISSOLUTION
Two brothers entered into a partnership agreement which pro-
vided that the partnership would "terminate upon the death of either
party." When one brother became disenchanted with the business, he
petitioned for dissolution, claiming that the agreement created a
partnership of unlimited duration which could be dissolved unilater-
ally at any time. Reversing both lower courts, the Louisiana supreme
court agreed with the plaintiff's contention and held that in the ab-
sence of bad faith, a partnership which is terminable at death may
be dissolved of right at any reasonable time. Stone v. Stone, 292 So.
witness' computation of loss of future earnings including 5% yearly increase in wages
because of future inflation, based on expert's computation of the past history of infla-
tion).
25. Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733 (W.D. Mich. 1967) (expert testi-
mony in personal injury action using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics). Cf.
Sadler v. Wagner, 5 Wash. App. 77, 486 P.2d 330 (1971) (dicta in personal injury suit
noting that it is proper to admit "authoritative tables" into evidence, though giving
no indication as to what court would consider an "authoritative table"). But see Pierce
v. New York Cent. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (although noting statistics
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the court used an arbitrary 5% figure).
26. Scruggs v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Va. 1970).
27. Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665 (Alas. 1967) (court presumed inflation was
"here to stay," and felt that future inflation would offset a present value reduction);
Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974) (evidence presented by expert witness
tended to show that a present value reduction would be offset by future inflationary
increases).
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